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Insofar as its popularity is concerned, the doctrine of the law of nature has
had a cyclical history. At its peaks, the doctrine has formed the basis of many
laws, even governments; at its depths it has been accused of being but fiction.
Commencing in ancient times, its last great wave of popular devotion and ac-
ceptance was during the American and French Revolutions. Since then, appar-
ently because there was no new great cause (such as the overthrowing of a
tyrannical government) to inspire a need for explaining man's actions by the
law of reason, the doctrine has again been neglected. But today, when all peoples
are seeking to find a formula for world peace, we may expect a revival of interest
in. the doctrine. The United Nations are seeking a basis for world understanding,
and it is not unlikely that such a basis will be found in natural law for it creates
a sense of right common to all mankind without which no international organiza-
tion can long survive.
Ever since the time of the Stoics natural law has stood for an expression of
the unity of mankind and the ability of men to determine by reason what is just.
This kind of thinking led to the Declaration of Independence with its premise
that all men, by virtue of their humanity alone, were entitled to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happin'es. And it is this kind of thinking that is the crystallization
of belief in a power for good which can transcend the barriers of race or national-
ity.
Because we seek world peace, and because it is just possible that a formula
for peace will be found by reawakening and applying anew the law of nature,
it is urgent that we understand that doctrine's meaning. To do this we had best
examine the origin and historical development of that ancient law, and that is
what this paper purports to do. Although of necessity it treats but superficially
a subject of tremendous scope, it is hoped that the essentials have been pre-
sented from which men who would govern the world of today can derive values
of real significance.
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Philosophers, political scientists, lawyers, churchmen-all of our great
thinkers who have dwelled upon the existence and order of things in the universe-
have generally agreed that there are superior principles of right, or higher laws
to which the ordinary civil rules made by man must conform and which necessarily
place limits on the operation of such rules. The best known and most influential
form of the higher law doctrines centers around the term ",natural law" or "law of
nature." Although this doctrine has been for centuries the subject of contention
and criticism, it is important to note that it has survived and in many forms
exists today as the basis of law of many governments and even world society.
For this reason, then, the investigation of the origin and development of natural
law doctrines should prove profoundly interesting to students of present-day
law and government, and it is primarily to them that this brief analysis is di-
rected.
Graeco-Roman Concepts of Natural Law
The Greeks were among the first to formulate ideas of natural law. Aristotle,
in discussing justice, described it as being either natural, as in accordance with
nature, and hence universal, or local and conventional, as applicable to a particular
place.' The higher law, as Aristotle visualized it, was unwritten, universal, eternal
and immutable, and in accordance with nature. He divided law into that which
is common, being in accordance with nature and in force everywhere, and that
which is peculiar to each separate community.
2
Although the Greeks may have fathered natural law concepts, it was the
Stoics who are responsible for its distinctive form.3 Their concern spread over
a greater area than the city-state, encompassing the different nations in the
Alexandrian empire. They tried to formulate a connecting link between their
general conception of nature, as governed by reason, and the mind of man. In
short:
"The fundamental principle of Stoic ethics and plitics is existence
of a universal and world-wide law, which is one with reason both in
nature and human nature and which accordingly knits together in a
common social bond every being which possesses reason, whether god
or man."'
From the Stoics, the ideal of natural law descended to the Romans who made
more use of the theories and put their views into more enduring forms. The
Romans, in order to regulate commercial dealings with aliens, developed a
law common to all nations, or jus gentium, which tended to displace the rigors
I Nichomachean Ethics, 7; E. Burle,' Essai historique sur le developpement de la nation de droit na-
turel dans l'antiquite grecque (Trevoux, 1908) chap. 14.
2 Haines, the Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge, Mass; 1930) 6.
8 Stapleton, Justice and World Society (N. Carolina, 1944) 13.
4 Cicero, On the Commonwealth (trans. by Sabine and Smith, Ohio, 1929) 22.
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of the jus civile.5 Natural law, or jus naturale, was at this time more than an
object of contemplation for the philosopher; it actually was the standard with
which actual laws in the hands of the judge and practical administrator had to
conform in order to merit the name of justice.
Roman jurists like Gaius, Ulpian, and compilers of the Institutes of Justinian
took the law of nature as a basic premise, but they did not contribute materially
to its theoretical development. The most that the latter group did was to attempt
to discriminate between the rules and instincts common to animals-the jus
naturale; rules common to all mankind-the jus gentium; and the particular rules
of a community-jus civile, and this classification was adopted by certain medieval
jurists.
6
Medieval Theories of Natural Law
From the Romans the idea of natural law was adopted by the Church Fathers
and later was enshrined in canon law. The process by which the identification
of the law of God with the principles of secular law took place during the first
centuries of the Christian era is most important. It represents the distinguishing
f'eature of the medieval philosophy of law, and was the more significant since
civilians, as well as the Fathers and the canonists, were prone to yield to the
authority of the jus dei jus naturale. Acording to this teaching everyone was under
the law and responsible to God.
7
Isidor'e of Seville and Gratian re-echoed the Roman jurists' tripartite classifica-
tion of law with this difference: that jus naturale was the common law of nations
without any reference to animal instincts. Natural law was identified with divine
law and human law with custom; the jus gentium and the jus civile were included
under the latter.8 Thomas Aquinas made the further distinction that eternal
and divine laws form a part of the universe and emanate from God, from natural
laws which were the result of the participation of man as a rational creature
in applying to human affairs the eternal law by which he distinguished between
good and evil. Unlike earlier Roman thinkers, Aquinas held that the particular
rules of natural law were not immutable but, since they were rational laws designed
for human ends, they were subject to change as human conditions varied. 9
Medieval churchmen invariably identified nature and reason with a personal
God and law and rights emanated from His will. Following Aquinas, their divisions
of law were: divine, natural and positive. Medieval jurists usually accepted
the Roman division of law into natural law, law of nations and civil law. In
this age, it is important to note, there was little legislation in the modern sense.
Enactments usually were designed to affirm existing rules or customs or to
5 Sohm's Institutes, 3d ed; (trans. by Ledlie, London, 1907) 79.
6 Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West (New York, 1903), II, 28 ff.
7 Id at 1, 106-110.
8 Id at II, 28, 105.
9 Summa Theologie, 1, 2, et seq.
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remedy abuses in administration.' 0 Civilians thought of law, not as the creation
of human will, but as the application of principles or customs.
We have seen that with the early Greeks natural law was law in accordance
with nature in the physical sense. To the Church Fathers natural law was divine
in origin and either comprised rules given to man by God or his representatives
or consisted of divine law from which principles of right and justice might
be deduced by man's reason. There were still other types of natural law conceived
of by medieval thinkers. Primarily amongst them was that which was comprised
of rules or principles of law and justice substantially divorced from divine origins,
a form from which grew international law and parts of developing public law
in later centuries. From natural law, too, there arose concepts of natural rights-
such as rights of equality and freedom. These rights, as we shall see, became the
basis for civil government as was later developed by the English, French and
American philosophers.
English Contribution to Natural Law Theories
It has for a long time been assumed that the ancient and medieval concepts
of natural law had never been accepted as principles of English law, since the
English did not draw heavily for their law from the Roman or canonical codes.
Recent investigations, however, demonstrate that the doctrines of the law of
nature or law of reason were actually important links between the two legal
systems."
From the dominant idea of medieval thinkers that law should be supreme,
and superior to the state itself, English judges evolved the peculiar English
doctrine of the supremacy of the law which bound even the king.' 2 Some jurists of
the time, notably Coke,' 3 maintained that the supreme law limited Parliament
too, and that it reflected a common reason and superior principles of justice of
which the common law courts were the ultimate interpretors. Others argued
that there was no case on record in which the wills of the King and of Parliament
were thwarted by the courts. However, there were undoubtedly many cases in
which the courts changed the meaning of statutes by interpreting the common
law through application of the basic principles of reason.
14
Due to an understandable aversion to Continental ideas and to the influence
of church and of Roman law, it became the English practice to speak of reason
in preference to the medieval concept of the law of nature. Natural justice or
reason, which the common law recognizes and applies, does not differ from the
10 McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy (New Haven, 1910) 42, 46.
11 Ibid; also Holdsworth, A History of English Law, II, 133 ff.
12 Holdsworth, History of English Law, II, 131, 195.
13 MacKay, Coke-Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy of the Law, Mich, L. R., XXII
(Jan. 1924) 215.
See also Mullett, Fundamental Law and the American Revolution, (New York 1933) 44-47.
14 Pluncknett, Statutes and Their Interpretation in the Fourteenth Century, Part II.
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law of nature which the Romans identified with jus gentium and which the
medieval jurists accepted as being divine law revealed chiefly through man's
natural reason. As one writer sums up the English thinking:
"The Common Law is pictured invested with a halo of dignity,
peculiar to the embodiment of the deepest principles and to the highest
expression of human reason and of the law of nature implanted by God
in the heart of man. Common Law is the perfect ideal law; for it is natural
reason developed and expounded by the collective wisdom of many
generations."' 5
The growth of the common law has taken place in an inductive, experimental
and pragmatic manner. This growth has been conditioned by the famous rule
of reason which prevented the rigid and archaic procedure and rules of the
English legal system from remaining long in force when they were not in
accord with social and economic conditions. The repeated appearance of the
rule of reason in English law bears witness to the fact that natural law doctrines
have not been discarded from the English jurisprudence.
Natural Law Reaches America
About the time of the early co!onization of America, Grotius, Pufendorf
and other writers gave great significance in political and religious matters to the
rights and liberties of the individual. Instead of natural law or rules of superior
validity, jus naturale was translated into a theory of natural rights--qualities
inherent in man which it is the duty of the state to protect. Their belief was that
there is a source of natural rights in certain inherent qualities belonging to in-
dividuals and these rights, which were sanctioned by natural law, might be dis-
covered by human reason.1"
In the process of transplanting fundamental law theories and establishing
their own doctrines of public and private law, the colonists relied heavily upon
the English common law. But as a rule the law was applied by persons untrained
in the technical procedure and rules of the English system. Courts and judges
frequently found themselves required to make law for the occasion with naught
to guide them except the Bible, the precepts of natural law or natural justice,
and the community sentiment of what ought to be right and just. Under such cir-
cumstances appeals were frequently made to natural law or to allied concepts.
17
The popularity of the concepts of natural rights and of natural law was greatly
enhanced when they were espoused by leaders of the American Revolution.
Samuel Adams, John Adams, Thomas Paine, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson
made frequent use of the natural rights doctrine to support the right of rebellion
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers.
15 Figgis, the Divine Right of Kings, 228-229.
16 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book I. Chap. I.
17 Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge, Mass., 1930) 52.
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This popularity was not to last indefinitely, however, and just as natural
law doctrines became discredited in Europe, so were they gradually given less and
less credence in the conservative reaction which followed the periods of the
Revolution and of the Confederation. The effect in the United States was some-
what to narrow the scope of the law of nature thinking and to give the term
a rigidity which tended to support the existing legal order. Nevertheless, under
these conditions the courts fostered the gradual acceptance of some natural law
principles in the public law of the United States. Primarily, the existence of
those principles is to be found in American constitutional law, as it has been de-
veloped by the courts to protect vested rights against encroachments by legislative
acts or by popular majorities. In so doing, the courts recurred to the doctrine of
inalienable rights and to the theory of higher laws in order to change the due
process of law clause from merely a check on procedure in criminal matters to
a limitation on the general scope of legislative powers.
Conclusions and Observations
We have traced the law of nature from its early origin down to the present
day and have shown some of the different doctrines concerning it. In conclusion
it may be well to summarize some of its main elements on which most writers
have agreed.18
First, was the belief that justice is not merely an ideal of man's devising,
but is a part of nature. That is, the law of nature is established by God, and has
over other forms of law a logical priority.
The second great element of the law of nature is the recognition that justice
is intelligible, that it may be rationally apprehended by the human mind. The law
of nature is the law of reason. This is perhaps the most powerful article of political
belief, and from it stems all other claims to freedom.
Finally, the law of nature is universal. No race, nation or group can claim
a proprietary right in that sense of things which by definition transcends the
local and the accidental; conversely, no race, nation, or group can be excluded
from the natural community of all mankind.
The doctrine of the law of nature has undergone a considerable evolution,
and by the nineteenth century was deemed practically to have disappeared from
the forefront of our legal thinking. However, we now find that current legal
thought increasingly is returning to the concepts of natural law as criteria to
measure the justice or validity of civil enactments. Many factors are combining
to bring to the fore once more some of the ideas involved in the ancient doctrine
of natural law. As Roscoe Pound has said:
18 Stapleton, Justice and World Society (N. Carolina, 1944) 20-22.
19 Harvard L. Rev. XXV (Dec. 1911) 162.
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"It is not an accident that something like resurrection of natural
law is going on the world over."'19
With widely different purposes in view and with varying aproachts to the funda-
mental and permanent principles of the law, legal philosophers and jurists, in
applying concrete formulae of written charters, codes or statutes, are wont to
turn to modernized versions of the law of nature, or of its counterpart, the law
of reason. There are a number of prevailing tendencies in legal thinking which
are giving impetus to the revival of higher law theories. As Haines has so aptly
summed them up, they are:
"(1) The efforts to introduce in a more direct way ethical concepts into
law;
(2) The attempts to formulate ideal or philosophical standards to
measure positive laws;
(3) The establishment of criteria for judges and administrators when
they act as legislators; and
(4) A justification for limits on the sovereignty of states."20
As long as there will be civilization there will be law and order, and these tendencies
are bound to make themselves evident in the development thereof-and just so
long will there be applications, in one form or another, of natural law.
20 Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge, Mass., 1930) 309-310.
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